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IN THE

SUPREME~

COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH
MARIE C. CLAUSSE, Administratrix
of the Estate of LEON L. CLAUSSE,
Deceased,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.FIRST SECURITY CORPORATION, a
corporation, FIRST SECURITY BANK
OF UTAH, a corporation and AMERICAN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMpANY, a corporation,
Defendants and Respondents..

STATEMENT
To avoid unnecessary repetition, respondent First
Security Bank, hereinafter referred to as bank, wishes
to incorporate in its brief the statement of facts as
set forth in the brief of respondent insurance company
and the argument of said respondent wherever the same
is applicable to this respondent. As we develop our
argument, however, we will find it necessary to quote
somewhat from the testimony.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. NO CONTRACT WAS EVER MADE BE·TWEEN
DECEASED AND THE DEFENDANT BANK
UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF CAN RE.COVER AS
AGAINST SAID BANK.
2. IF SUCH A CONTRACT WAS MADE, THE
SAME IS VOID FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION.
3. THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDE·NCE OF
ANY AUTHORITY OF EITHER BLACKINGTON, JEPPESE:N OR PORTER TO BIND DEFENDANT BANK TO ANY ENFORCEABLE
CONTRACT WHICH WOULD BE BINDING
UPON THE BANK.
4. IF SUCH A CONTRACT WAS MADE, THE
SAME IS ULTRA VIRES AND BEYOND THE
POWERS O:Jr THE BANK.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1. NO CONTRACT WAS EVER MADE
BETWEEN DECEASED AND THE DEFENDANT
BANK UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF CAN RECOVER
AS AGAINST SAID BANK.
It seems to be plaintiff's theory that in so1ne
mysterious manner respondent bank agreed with deceased to insure his life from the time of the execution
of the loan until a policy of insurance was issued by
defendant insurance company, or to state it more broadly, perhaps a continuing insurance agree1nent should
deceased fail thereafter to obtain such a policy and
2
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if the borrower died before an enforceable policy of
insurance was issued, the bank would somehow and
from some source out of its capital asset, pay or cancel the loan. Construing Mrs. Clausse's testimony in
the most favorable terms, we fail to see wherein it can
be even inferred that such an agreement was ever
made. We quote briefly from her testimony which
also encompassed all of the testimony with . reference
to the making of this alleged agreement:·
"We applied for a loan of $2,500.00." (Tr. 16)
":1Ir. Jeppesen felt that he would have to
go out and appraise the property and see if
it was worth the value of the $2,500.00 and he
would go out possibly that afternoon. He and
Carl Porter came out together on the same
afternoon." (Tr. 19.)
"They told him (deceased) that we would
be able to get the $2,500.00 and Mr. Jeppesen
stopped and explained to him that if he would
come to the bank that he would have the papers
drawn up and so after he had given the· note and
mortgage on plac~, he explained to _him they had
a plan, an insurance plan, on that mortgage and
told him that if he wanted it that he could pay
it at the bank along with the mo.rtgage and we
asked him how much the payments on that would
be and he said around $3.00." (Tr. 20).
"He explained to us that they had an agreement with the insurance company for an insurance plan in case anything·: should happen
to him, he being the bread winner so to speak
and that it would take care of the mortgage in
case anything should happen to him. He said,
Lee, I would like to see ·you take out ·this plan
3
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so that your mortgage would be covered by it
and Lee asked him what the plan was and he
told him it was an insurance plan to insure the
mortgage in case anyt~ing should happen to hin1
and he asked him how much it would be· and he
said, well, it would be between $2.50 and· $3.00
a month~ He didn't write out the plan but they
would send a representative to furnish the' pia~.
My husband asked him how these payments
would be made and he said it would be added
to our mortgage installments and be paid to the
bank along with the mortgage; so he said that
they would take care of so it would be paid along
with the mortgage beginning the first of the
month in February. He (deceased) told him that
he would like to take the insurance but he felt
that it was not necessary to take the full $2,500.00
and he thought that $2,000.00 would be plenty;
and Mr. Jeppesen said, well, that was 0. K. and
then Mr. Porter spoke up and said, Lee, I would
like to see you take. out the insurance plan. 1\fr.
Jeppesen took and handed him a pamphlet of
the insurance plan." Plaintiff's Exhibit "A".
(Tr. 22, 23).
"Mr. Jeppesen told me he would prepare
that (note and mortgage) and I could come into
the bank and get the mortgage and note x x x x
I went to the bank and got the note." (Tr. 24)
"Jeppesen told me that Lee had authorized
him to go ahead with the insurance, that he
would send the representative out and it would
be added to the installments to be paid at the
bank and that he would send hin1 out; that he
didn't write the insurance, the mortgage insurance, but he would send a representative out to
the house." (Tr. 25)
4
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"Later we received a letter from the bank
with respect to the mortgage plan. December
27, 1948." Exhibit "B". (Tr. 26)
Plaintiff then testified that later Mr. Blackington
called at her home and, over the objection of respondent
that it was hearsay as against the bank, she. was
permitted (pro forma) to relate the conversation with·
Blackington. (See Tr. 30).
"He (Blackington) said he had come out
as Mr. Jeppesen had asked him to come out and
go over the mortgage plan with Lee and myself.
He also represented the insurance or the plan
that was With the First Security Bank." ( Tr. 30)
"The first premium was to be paid. February
1st, 1949." (Tr. 32).
"Blackington said he would have the doctor
come for examination of applicant. Dr. Kearns
came to make the examination about January
6th or 7th." (Tr. 32)
Over the further objection of the bank, the court
permitted plaintiff to answer the following:

"Q. Was there anything said by Blackington
in this conversation as to when the insurance on
the home or the mortgage would take effect~"
to which she answered :
"A. It would take effect immediately all
during the period of the mortgage." (Tr. 35, 36)
On cross examination plaintiff testified that after
she first talked to Jeppesen about obtaining the loan
and after Jeppesen and Porter had appraised the
property they told her that the home was of sufficient
5
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value to justify making the loan and that they would
make the loan and that they did make the loan. (See
Tr. 33) That she understood when she signed the note
and mortgage that they were to receive the $2,500.00;
that the transaction respecting the making of the loan
was completed on December 18, 1948. (See Tr. 44) She
understood the plan. It was to take out a life insurance
policy on Lee's life so that if he died while the policy
was in force the proceeds from the insurance policy
would be used to pay the mortgage indebtedness. She
further understood that there had to be an insurance
policy taken out and maintained before the plan could
work. (See Tr. 46).
After some further questioning the following question was asked and answer made :

"Q. So you knew that the bank wasn't going
to pay it unless there was a policy issued by the
insurance company so that the insurance conlpany would pay the policy, didn't you f'
"A. Yes." (Tr. 48)

"Q. Sure, there had to be a policy issued.
You understood

that~"

"A. That is right." (Tr. 48, 49)
There is nothing in the foregoing evidence, construed most favorably in plaintiff's favor, which can
by the remotest possibility be construed to mean that
the bank agreed to pay off the note or cancel the indehtedness if the borrower died before a valid policy of
insurance was written, nor can it be construed as an
6
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agreement that the insured would be covered by insurance from the date the mortgage was made. The converse clearly appears. The bank merely suggested a
method whereby, independently of the loan, a borrower
could by taking insurance protect his family against loss
by purchasing an insurance policy on his life and for
his own convenience permit the borrower to pay the
insurance monthly at the bank along with the monthly
payments on the loan. Construed most favorably to
the plaintiff, it can mean no more than a conditional
offer or an agreement on condition that if and when
the borrower obtained such a policy and paid the
premiums thereon bound the insurance company by the
terms of a policy, that the bank would act as a collecting
agent for the parties in the matter of collecting the
premium and remitting to the insurance company.

POINT 2. IF SUCH A CONTRACT WAS MADE,
THE SAME IS VOID FOR LACK OF CONSIDER.ATION. It is our position that the alleged agreement
relative to insurance (granting for argument's sake that
there was such an agreement) was wholly independent
of the making of the mortgage. The evidence quoted
supra shows clearly that the mortgage was fully consummated by the bank on the strength of the security
offered by the borrower; that the ·note and mortgage
was executed and the money paid before Blackington
called upon the borrowers relative to obtaining an
application for insurance. The borrowers' loan was
approved when the home was appraised on December
18, 1948. The claimed agreement was alleged to have
7
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been entered into after this date. If such is the case,
then the borrowers gave no consideration whatsoever for
the alleged promise on the part of the bank.
Smith vs. Brown
50 Utah, 27
165 Pac. 468
Van Tassell vs. Lewis
----------------Utah _______________ _
222 P. 2nd. 350
Harris vs. Morgensen
196 P. 2nd. 317
Watson vs. American Creosote Works
84 P. 2nd. 431
Louk vs. Patten
73 P. 2nd 949
Oilman vs. Huddleston
64 P. 2nd 97
Richardson vs. Jordan
32 P. 2nd 826
POINT 3. THERE IS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF ANY AUTHORITY OF EITHER BLACI{INGTON, JEPPESEN OR PORTER TO BIND
DEFENDANT BANK TO ANY ENFORCEABLE
CONTRACT WHICH WOULD BE BINDING UPON
THE BANK. There is no competent evidence of any
authority of Blackington, Jeppesen or Porter to bind
defendant bank to a contract of the nature and scope
contended for by plaintiff. The court admitted pro
forma and over the objection of bank, conversations
between Blackington and plaintiff out of the presence
of any officer or official of the bank.
8
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A. Blackington was merely a local agent
of defendant insurance company and even as
between himself and his employer he had very
limited authority. (See respondent insurance
company's brief, pages 15 to 22) By what
process of reasoning can it be said he had any
authority to bind the bank by his alleged statement that the insurance would take effect
immediately. (See Tr. 36). He clearly had no
actual authority and we certainly fail to see how
he could have any implied authority. He was
sent out at the suggestion of the bank to solicit
an insurance policy on the life of the deceased.
That was the extent of his authority.
B. We further contend that neither Jeppesen
or Porter had the authority to bind defendant
bank in the making of a contract of the nature
and scope contended for. However, we prefer
to discuss this matter under point 4.
·
POINT 4. IF SUCH A CONTRACT WAS MADE,
THE SAME IS ULTRA VIRES AND BEYOND THE
POWERS OF THE BANK. It is alleged in the
amended complaint and admitted in the answer that
"def~ndant First Se.curity Bank of Utah is a corpo_ratton organized under the laws of the United .Stat~s
Government being a national bank." Defendant ther.efore derives its powers from the provision of the
national banking act found in Title 12, U.S.C.A. and
particularly under Chapter 2, Section 24, Page 18" The
following statements as to the powers and limitations
of national banks are all annotated in the code and
t:3Upported by the Fed~ral.and U.S. decisions.
I

9
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A. The powers conferred upon national banks
should not be interpreted to authorize injurious
policy unless fair construction of language clearly
requires it.
B. The measure of powers of national banks
is the statutory grant and powers not conferred
by Congress or denied.
C. The powers of a national bank are defined
and limited by the acts of Congress authorizing
the creation of such institutions.
D. National banks cannot generally exercise
any powers except those expressly granted or
incidental to carrying. on business.
E. National banks may exercise only such
powers as are created or authorized by federal
laws.
If we understand appellant's position clearly, she
is seeking to bind defendant bank by an alleged oral
agreement made by one of its Vice Presidents and a
local life insurance agent to the effect that the bank
would insure the life of the borrower to the extent of
Two Thousand Dollars during the period from the date
of the making of a loan until a valid insurance policy
was thereafter issued by an insurance company authorized to engage in the insurance business; or else that
Jeppesen agreed that if the borrower died before a
valid policy was so issued the bank would cancel the
indebtedness without the payment of the obligation.
The following is self evident:
A. Under the powers conferred on a national
bank there is not included therein the power or
authority to engage in the insurance business in
any form whatsoever.

10
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B. Before engaging in the insurance business
a COrpOration n1ust comply with the requirements
of the insurance code of the State of Utah nnd
qualify and be under the supervision of the
insurance commissioner. It is not contended that
defendant bank was so qualified. We contend
that if it can be successfully asserted that there
was an absolute unconditional agreement made
between Jeppesen, Porter and Blackington on
the one hand, and the deceased and his wife on
the other, that such an agreement was clearly
beyond the power or authority of Jeppesen or
any- other officer or employee of the bank. Such
an agreement would be ultra vires and beyond
the power and scope of any of its officers. While
of course the amount involved is not large yet if
Jeppesen and an insurance agent could make this
agreement, then by the same token they could
make an agreement involving a- loan of One
Hundred Thousand Dollars or possibly a Million
Dollars. Once the power is admitted, the limit
would be unqualified.
A mere statement of the problem illustrates
why national banks are limited in the scope of
their powers. For the safety of the depositors,
creditors and stockholders and to insure relative
safety of our financial structure, no such power
to fritter away the corporate assets of a national
bank can or should be allowed.
11
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We submit that the court was in error in admitting
even pro forma the evidence offered by the plaintiff
with respect to conversations between herself and
husband and Blackington, Jeppesen and Porter but of
course the error was corrected when the court granted
our motion to dismiss the action. We contend the court
was clearly right in .granting this motion and that the
order of the court should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN
Attorneys for Respondents
First Security Corporation and
First Security Bank of Utah,
National Association
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